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SAPC-25548  
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19 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Project Director

SUBJECT : TALENT/AQUATONE Security Problems

1. As you have noted in recent Ad Hoc Requirements Committee Minutes and my draft paper on this subject which we discussed orally, groups of TALENT users who need some aspects of operational information have been identified:

- a. Category A. Pls.
- b. Category B. ELINT processors, analysts, and technical advisers to ARC members.
- c. COMINT processors and those who are working on all source analysis in certain regards.
- d. ARC members, their alternates, and requirements advisers.

2. The foregoing all will invariably require or will in the course of their business almost surely be exposed to the following minimum types of operational data:

- a. Altitude.

- b. Time.
- c. Track.
- d. Range.

In addition, those who work directly in the ARC need or are likely to become exposed to information as follows:

- e. Base locations.
- f. Processing centers (ELINT or photographic) in the ZI or abroad.
- g. Weather areas (incident to providing intelligence guidance for Operations' planning).
- h. Certain characteristics of collection instrumentation.

The last item also will be of interest to certain PIs or electronic technicians.

3. There are other categories of Government officials with a TALENT clearance who are not in the process of exploiting TALENT materials but who need to know that the product exists, its quality and reliability, or its potential. I suggest that these fall into roughly two categories:

- a. High level supervisory personnel in all agencies (Generals, Admirals, etc.) and
- b. Research and Development personnel.

4. Up to the present, procedure for an AQUATONE clearance among TALENT users calls for the submission of a written statement of need to the CIA TCO who forwards the request to the Project Security Officer with a recommendation along with the name, date and place of birth, serial number, and date TOP SECRET clearance granted. Thereupon, the Project Security Officer, as I understand it, inspects the file as well as certain agencies' files. The delays incident to this procedure have been extensive and understandably so. My proposal for solving our TALENT/AQUATONE problem, set forth below, embraces a method for eliminating this bottleneck.

5. Before putting forth my proposal, I should also point out that there does not appear to be any workable scheme for exercising mechanical control of different degrees of operational information among the various items of such information identified in the preceding paragraphs. The only effective means of restricting information among those with proper certification lies, I believe, in the faithful application of the need to know or the must know principle. We have already sought to educate those in the TALENT system to this principle, and whereas I cannot categorically state that in every instance it is applied as I would prefer, my own investigations ~~to~~ would encourage me to believe that TALENT certified personnel are trying very hard to live up to that injunction.

Proposal

6. Each agency's TALENT Control Officer should forward to CIA TCO requests for certification for access to operational information with the following:

- a. Types of operational information required.
- b. Function for which such information is essential.
- c. Full name, date and place of birth, serial number, list of clearances held, statement of full field investigation and date of, and date TOP SECRET granted.

7. Upon receipt of the above request, the CIA TCO would forward the request to the Project Security Officer with his endorsement.

8. If the Project Security Officer finds the request in good order, he will promptly sign on the line "Approved for Certification".

9. This paper promptly returned to the originating TALENT Control Officer would then be listed as certified for code word information (e. g. , "CHECKERS"), representing the right to access to operational information on a must know basis. This certification would be listed on roster with the CIA TSO (where there is already a repository for the names of personnel cleared into the TALENT system wherever organizationally or physically located) as well as with the Project Security Officer if he so desires.

Comment: The foregoing will have the effect of requiring the same standards for clearance for Project information as are now applicable in the case of TALENT clearances. The standards for TALENT clearances are equal to those required for Special Intelligence in which system decentralized clearance procedures are already applicable. Each TCO or TSO for each agency or unit of organization or the CIA TSO will be immediately capable of identifying upon request whether Mr. Jones, for example, is certified for operational information, keeping in mind that the extent of such information he may have is based upon the fact that he must know it.

10. The Project Security Officer, having approved a request for an individual's CHECKERS certification, may now, as he does today, proceed to obtain any and all security files or information. Should he find derogatory information, he is in a position to raise the issue to have the party debriefed if necessary or to take other action which may be called for. This is what the Project Security Officer in certain instances may have to do under current procedures because on a number of occasions, I am informed, the need for an AQUATONE clearance is so pressing as to not permit the full exploration of all files prior to granting of clearance.

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11. All documentation or materials which reveal operational information as specified by the Project will now be labelled by a code word (for illustration at the moment: CHECKERS). In some cases when such materials enter the TALENT system they will be labelled "HANDLE VIA TALENT CONTROL SYSTEM". Where the document includes Special Intelligence, it will have added the proper code word. Or should the material be the product of AQUATONE in a penetration mission it will be labelled CHESS.

(The foregoing is not to suggest that within Operations operational information be handled any differently from at present for that is an internal Project problem.)

12. Under the foregoing proposals, it should be understood that proper handling of CHECKERS material will require that clerical and secretarial personnel in TALENT centers where the material moves will have to be certified although they will have no must know for the contents even as is true today in TALENT matters among couriers, secretaries, clerical and commo personnel.

13. Recommendation: That the proposal set forth above in paragraphs 6 through 12 be approved and that procedures for the implementation of these proposals within the TALENT system be immediately worked out and applied by the CIA TCO in consultation with the PSO and the TSO.

JQReber:cw

1-TCO; 2-TSO; 3-PSO; 4-chrono